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The use of economic theory to study the inter-
nal work of organizations has raised increased in-
terest among economists, as shown by the papers
of Baker et al. (1994) and Lazear (1999). The main
issues analysed by this literature concern the
study of internal labour markets, incentives,
wages, promotions, hiring procedures, workers’
evaluation and internal/external mobility.
This article aims at characterizing wage deter-
mination in general government in Portugal and
the main factors behind it, using data from the 2nd
General Public Administration Census (2º
Recenseamento Geral da Administração Pública),
which took place in December of 1999(1). It com-
plements, to a certain extent, the study of the wage
gap between private and public sectors by Portu-
gal and Centeno (2001). Here a more comprehen-
sive database is used and a detailed analysis of the
wage formation process in general government is
carried out, against the background of the
abovementioned literature.
The general government census includes infor-
mation not only on the characteristics of workers,
common to most labour force databases, but also
job specific information, in particular concerning
seniority in the job, occupational category, and
scope of government to which the worker belongs.
This information makes it possible, beyond ana-
lyzing the wage return associated with individual
characteristics (age, gender and education, for ex-
ample), to study the impact on wages of match-
specific variables measuring the progression of
workers within general government.
The article deals with two main issues. The first
is the analysis of the wage returns to human capi-
tal endowment (in particular, education and se-
niority). A special attention is also devoted to the
gender wage gap. The second aspect concerns the
characterization of public administration as an
“internal labour market”, featuring careers with
well-defined entry points and a rigid “bot-
tom-top” progression. The paper investigates
these issues together with the wage incentives
given to workers throughout their career. The em-
pirical evidence is mainly based on an examina-
tion of the impact of the occupational category on
wages, on an analysis of the progression pattern,
estimated as the average return by year of
seniority, and on wage dispersion over time in
various occupational categories.
It is worth noting that a full examination of the
working and incentives in general government as
an internal labour market requires a comparison
with a reference group, typically given by the pri-
vate sector. However, such comparison is not
made in this article.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2
presents a brief description of the database, focus-
ing on the variable hourly wage. Section 3 is on the
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(1) The database put together using census data was provided to
the Banco de Portugal by the Direcção-Geral da Administração
Pública. The first survey of this kind took place in October of
1996.econometric methodology. Sections 4 and 5 exam-
ine the results, highlighting the return to educa-
tion and seniority and the gender wage gap. Sec-
tion 6 analyses the progression pattern and rigid-
ity in the progression for several occupational cat-
egories. Section 7 presents the conclusions.
2. DATABASE
The database comprises 677,715 civil servants(2),
covering all public administration bodies except
for military personnel and the regional govern-
ment employees of Região Autónoma dos Açores.
The database contains many variables normally
used to study careers inside an organization.
The key variable in this study is the wage
earned by each employee. This variable is mea-
sured by the hourly wage, calculated from the in-
formation on the monthly wage and the hours
worked per week. The information regarding indi-
vidual characteristics includes gender, age and ed-
ucation. The main variables concerning the posi-
tion of the worker inside public administration are
seniority in the job, the scope of government (cen-
tral, local and regional, and, in the case of central
government, information about the ministry), the
occupational category and the legal nature of the
work relationship(3). Appendix 1 presents some
descriptive statistics that summarize the distribu-
tion of hourly wages and seniority in the job (Ta-
bles 1 and 2). The remaining tables in Appendix 1
present the distribution of employees according to
other variables: education, type of contract, scope
of government/ministry and occupational category
(Tables 3 to 7).
The distribution of hourly wages is the starting
point of this paper, and is therefore analysed in
detail. Chart 1A shows an estimate of the probabil-
ity density function of hourly wages in general
government and in the private sector (information
from the Quadros de Pessoal 1999 is used for the pri-
vate sector(4)). The comparison between densities
already points to important differences regarding
location and dispersion of wages and their seg-
mentation. Both distributions are left-skewed, that
is, wages concentrate in the lower tail of the distri-
bution. However, this characteristic is much more
marked in the private sector, where a larger pro-
portion of employees have wages close to the min-
imum wage(5). Consequently, the median wage in
the private sector is well below the median wage
in general government. On the other hand, the
wage distribution in public administration is
clearly multi-modal and much less smooth than in
the private sector. Such characteristics reflect the
marked wage segmentation that exists in the pub-
lic sector, where the rigid conditions of entry and
progression in careers lead to the concentration of
employees at certain remuneration levels and to
homogeneous progression across the wage
distribution.
Charts 1B and 1C present the probability den-
sity functions for the wages of male and female
workers and graduate/non-graduate workers, but
only for public sector employees.
The wage distribution for graduate workers is
much more symmetric than for non-graduates. In
both cases the distributions are clearly
multi-modal. On the other hand, given that the
proportion of non-graduate workers is higher
among men, the distribution of wages for the lat-
ter is also much more asymmetric. Thus, while av-
erage salaries for men and women are relatively
close, median salaries are quite apart, with the
male median salary considerably lower.
This first analysis reveals some features of
wages in the public sector that will be investigated
in the rest of the paper:
. A strong impact of education on wage dif-
ferentiation;
. A clear segmentation of the wage distribu-
tion (multi-modality).
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(2) The concept of “civil servant” is wider in Portugal than in other
countries and includes, for instance, public doctors, nurses,
teachers and local government employees.
(3) The database contains other variables that were not used in this
paper, such as, geographical information about the service and
entity to which the worker belongs and about the location of
the workplace.
(4) The Quadros de Pessoal result from an annual survey carried out
by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security collecting
information on all private sector employees.
(5) The minimum wage does not apply to general government, but
the lowest wage levels in place are close to it.3. METHODOLOGY
Wage determination analysis is usually carried
out by estimating wage regression equations,
where the hourly wage appears as a dependent
variable, and different proxies for the stock of hu-
man capital as explanatory variables. The latter
can be divided into general human capital, mea-
sured through the education level (in this paper
four groups were considered: less than lower sec-
ondary education, lower secondary education, up-
per secondary education and post secondary edu-
cation) and experience, and specific human
capital, measured through seniority in the
organization.
The effect of experience can be separated from
the effect of seniority depending on the quality of
the information for the first variable and on the in-
cidence of long-term jobs. The database includes
information about seniority in public administra-
tion but not about experience in the labour market
(although a proxy for this variable can be obtained
using age). However, in general government,
given the high incidence on long-term jobs, both
variables should have similar informational con-
tent. In fact, the proportion of workers with more
than 20 years of seniority among those older than
45 is about 69 per cent. Since seniority proved to
have more explanatory power, this variable was
used in the wage regression equations. A non-lin-
ear term (seniority squared) was included in the
model in order to capture the possibility of an in-
crease in the wage with seniority at a non-constant
rate. The model includes also variables to differen-
tiate the gender and the type of contract (that is,
permanent staff or other type of contract(6)). The
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(b) Data for the general government from the 2nd General
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Segurança Social.
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where ln yi is the log of the hourly wage for indi-
vidual i; E i 9 , E i 12 , ELici are dummy variables for
the education levels: lower secondary, upper sec-
ondary, post-secondary; Ai is seniority (in years);
Ai
2 is seniority squared; Mi is a dummy variable
for male; Vi is an dummy variable for non-perma-
nent staff.
As already mentioned, the census also has in-
formation on variables concerning the position of
the employees within public administration, like
the scope of government/ministry and occupa-
tional category. However, the interpretation of the
explanatory power of these variables has to be
made with caution taking into account that its im-
pact cannot be isolated from the impact of vari-
ables relating to individual characteristics. This as-
pect is particularly evident as far as the relation-
ship between schooling and occupational category
is concerned. In fact, access to most categories re-
quires a certain education level. Thus the inclusion
of variables concerning the position of the em-
ployee within public administration makes sense
in order to determine their additional impact, as
well as a possible change in the wage returns ini-
tially estimated in equation (1) (in particular, re-
garding education). Two additional specifications
were estimated, one including dummy variables,
for the scope of government/ministry and a
second one with dummies for the occupational
category.
The different specifications were estimated in
the first place using the ordinary least squares
method. This yields the mean impact on the
hourly wage of worker i conditioned to a given
value for the worker endowment in each of the
characteristics controlled for in the equation. This
method does not allow us to determine the impact
of the explanatory variables over the wage distri-
bution. That kind of information is given by an al-
ternative estimation method: the quantile regres-
sion, which estimates the impact of each explana-
tory variable at different quantiles of the distribu-
tion of the dependent variable –  Qy X  | (7):
     Qy X X    |, ,  01
If we let the quantile for which the equation is esti-
mated to vary, it is possible to obtain a complete
characterization of the distribution of yconditional
on the values assumed by the explanatory vari-
ables, and to assess their impact at any point of the
distribution of y. This aspect is particularly impor-
tant for an analysis of wage distributions. For ex-
ample, when the male/female wage gap is being
assessed, it is common to find a sizeable gap only
at higher quantiles, and not at intermediate and
lower quantiles of the wage distribution (the
so-called glass ceiling effect). In this context,
quantile regression has evident merits in
comparison to least squares regression.
4. EDUCATION, SENIORITY AND
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY
The results of the estimation of equation (1) us-
ing the two methods are presented in Charts 2 and
3 for the education and seniority variables, respec-
tively. The detailed econometric results are shown
in Appendix 2. It is worth noting that the esti-
mated coefficients are, almost without exception,
statistically significant (see Appendix 2, Table 1 for
the estimated coeficients).
The dependent variable (hourly wage) was
specified in logs, and therefore the coefficient esti-
mates can be interpreted as the differential effect
(in percentage) relative to the omitted category for
the education variables in Chart 2 (the reference
category being “less than secondary education”)
and an additional year of seniority in Chart 3(8).
For instance, workers with completed lower sec-
ondary education earn about 24 per cent more
than workers without that education level, at the
median of the hourly wage; and workers with 15
years of seniority receive around 25 per cent more
than those with 5 years, also at the median.
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(6) Mainly contratos a termo certo e contratos administrativos de
provimento, which are both fixed-term contracts.
(7) See, for instance, Buchinsky (1998) about this estimation
method. Applications in the context of the wage gap between
the public and private sectors can be found, for example, in
Poterba and Rueben (1994) and Melly (2003).
(8) The exact impact is obtained as e
b 	 1, where b is the coefficient
estimate. However, for “small” values of b, e
b 	 1 is approxi-
mately equal to b.Previous papers established that the wage re-
turns to education in Portugal, in particular as far
as university education is concerned, are very high
(see, for example, Portugal and Centeno (2001)
and Portugal (2004)). Our results indicate that a
civil servant with post-secondary education bene-
fits from a wage premium of 75 to 100 per cent in
comparison to his/her counterparts with lower
secondary education. The charts show that the
wage returns to schooling increase monotonically
along the wage curve (approximately until the
90th percentile), with the premium at the lower
[upper] percentiles being much smaller [higher]
than the least squares estimate. The aforemen-
tioned papers established that wage earnings
stemming from education in public administration
are higher than those estimated for workers
employed in the private sector.
Returns to seniority are one indicator for the
existence of an internal labor market inside organi-
zations and a measure for the reward to specific
human capital. A significant seniority premium
can be economically justified as the payment of ef-
ficiency wages, but in a sector with strong employ-
ment protection the justification can be the exis-
tence of rents which are not economically justified.
The seniority coefficients indicate a positive linear
component of around 3.5 per cent, while the qua-
dratic component is negative, implying decreasing
salary returns to seniority. Chart 3 presents the im-
pact corresponding to an additional year of senior-
ity, as the employees move forward in their career,
for the various percentiles of the wage distribu-
tion. The impact, at each percentile, is decreasing
in seniority, reflecting the decreasing marginal ef-
fect of this variable. Note, however, that while for
lower seniority levels the marginal impact remains
more or less constant throughout the wage distri-
bution, for higher levels of seniority the marginal
impact is clearly smaller in the left tail (reflecting a
more negative non-linear term). This result
captures a stronger effect of wage ceilings for
workers with high seniority among the worse paid
occupational categories.
An examination of the change in education pre-
mium with seniority is an issue typically dealt
with in studies such as this. Indeed one may ex-
pect that the importance of education, as a mea-
sure of general human capital, weakens as work-
ers accumulate specific human capital. In order to
investigate this issue, a specification correspond-
ing to equation (1) was estimated, for each level of
seniority. The results are shown in Chart 4. While
the role of education becomes slightly less impor-
tant after about 1/3 of the professional life, the co-
efficient remains high and significant. This result
suggests a failure to reward the acquisition of spe-
cific human capital by workers and of the learning
process that is usually thought to occur inside or-
ganizations. Educational attainment remains a
consistently important wage-determining factor
through the whole professional life.
Banco de Portugal / Economic Bulletin / Autumn 2005 5
Articles
Chart 2

















Note: Coefficients for the education variables in equation
(1), OLS and quantile regression methods.
Chart 3

















Note: Coefficients for seniority variables in equation (1),
quantile regression method. Marginal impact com-
puted as   45 2  Ai.Finally, it is worth mentioning the result for the
indicator of the type of contract. This variable cap-
tures workers with a non-permanent contract. The
coefficient is negative at the bottom of the wage
distribution and positive at the top (see Appendix
2, Table 1). This result captures, for the lower paid
workers, the impact of weaker work relationships
in the form of fixed-term contracts which translate
into a wage penalty. For workers in the upper part
of distribution, it reflects the wage premium bene-
fitting those employees occupying managerial po-
sitions and/or in governmental offices who are not
permanent workers and receive a higher wage.
The coefficient for the male gender variable is pos-
itive and increases along the wage curve, indicat-
ing the existence of a gender wage gap, in
particular at the top of the distribution of salaries.
As mentioned above, the estimation of two ad-
ditional specifications containing variables on the
employees’ position within general government
was carried out as a second step. Those specifica-
tions include, besides the variables in specification
(1), dummy variables differentiating the scope of
government/ministry and occupational category.
The results of these two regressions are shown in
Appendix 2, Table 2 and 3. The most important
outcome is the strong negative impact of occupa-
tional category on the returns to education. In
Chart 5 we show the results for the case of
post-secondary education, but the same phenome-
non can be observed for the other education levels
(see Appendix 2, Table 3). This result indicates that
the importance of the education endowment trans-
lates mainly into a requirement to reach a certain
occupational category. It also shows that the sig-
nificance of education as a wage-determining fac-
tor throughout the career comes down to employ-
ees’ staying in the same occupational category
over their professional life. Here there is again evi-
dence of strong wage segmentation and of the ex-
istence of procedures consistent with those of an
internal labour market in general government. It is
worth noting that similar studies for the private
sector (see Lima and Pereira (2003) for the Portu-
guese case) indicate a much smaller impact of
occupational category on the coefficients
measuring the reward to education even when
internal labour markets cannot be ruled out for
private firms.
As far as the coefficients for the dummy vari-
ables on the scope of government/ministry are
concerned, their magnitude is small, except to the
extent that they reflect the prevalence of certain
occupational categories within a given ministry.
This conclusion was confirmed by means of an ad-
ditional regression polling all dummy variables
(that is, those relating to the scope of govern-
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Note: Coefficients of schooling variables in a model corre-
sponding to equation (1), by years of seniority.
Chart 5
CHANGE IN THE IMPACT OF SCHOOLING
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Note: Coeficient for the post-secondary school variable in
equation (1) and in the equation including the occu-
pational category (dotted), quantile regression
method.ment/ministry and to occupational category). The
non-existence of significant wage differentiation
among ministries is an indication of the lack of
competition for hiring the best workers and, there-
fore, of incentives for internal mobility within
general government.
The impact of taking into account occupational
categories on the returns to seniority is shown in
Chart 6. The inclusion of this variable allows us to
control for the difference among the wage levels of
the various occupational categories. At the bottom
of the wage distribution the differences in the re-
turns to seniority are now more pronounced than
in Chart 3, with a clearer reduction of the returns
to seniority for worse-paid workers at the end of
their careers. At the top of the wage distribution
the difference is smaller, with a more clear impact
of wage ceilings for most categories.
The behaviour of the wage returns for senior
workers provides an additional insight. The pre-
mium for one extra year of seniority at the end of
professional life is significantly bigger between the
median and the last decile of the wage distribu-
tion, compared to lower wage levels. This result,
obtained after controlling for education and occu-
pational category, points to a high wage growth
for employees at the top of the wage distribution,
those that had relatively more successful careers in
public administration. However, such an effect
vanishes in the last decile, reflecting the impact of
wage ceilings.
5. GENDER WAGE PREMIUM
The existence of a gender wage gap is one of
the issues typically dealt with when the behaviour
of wages inside organizations is being studied.
This phenomenon is common to countries with
different institutional regimes, but is less frequent
in the public sector almost everywhere. This sec-
tion examines the wage gap between men and
women in Portuguese general government. Chart
7 shows the coefficient estimates for males control-
ling for the individual characteristics and senior-
ity, and additionally for occupational category, as
well as the raw wage difference between the two
groups, at the various percentiles.
Women earn higher wages than men outside
the tails of the wage distribution, the raw wage
gap being negative approximately between the
percentiles 15 and 85. This results fits in with the
fact that the average salary for female workers is
higher than that for male workers (see Appendix
1). However, adding individual characteristics as
controls, the gap becomes positive over the wage
distribution and its magnitude becomes larger at
the upper percentiles. Therefore, the higher sala-
ries earned by women are not enough to compen-
sate for their larger human capital endowment, in
particular in terms of schooling (see Appendix 1).
Controlling also for the occupational category, the
gap remains positive but lower, which means that
part of the observed inequality is due to the preva-
lence of men in those occupational categories with
higher returns to education.
The wage difference between the two groups
can be decomposed into two components: one as-
sociated with the rate of return to each characteris-
tic (that is, the price of that characteristic in the la-
bour market), and another that reflects the endow-
ment composition. This procedure, initially pro-
posed by Oaxaca (1973), consists in estimating
separately for each group the wage return associ-
ated with the different characteristics. The Oaxaca
decomposition compares the specific wage returns
at the sample average of the regressors. Machado
and Mata (2005) carried out an extension of this
Banco de Portugal / Economic Bulletin / Autumn 2005 7
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CHANGE IN THE MARGINAL IMPACT
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Note: Coefficient for seniority variables in the equation in-
cluding the occupational category, quantile regres-
sion method. Marginal impact computed as
  45 2  Ai.approach that makes such a comparison possible
at any point in the wage distribution.
Table 1 presents the Machado-Mata decomposi-
tion for the difference between salaries of men and
women. The figures confirm that women have a
larger human capital endowment, which signifi-
cantly contributes to the raw wage gap. However,
if the price of the various characteristics was the
same for both groups, the difference in the educa-
tion endowment would lead to an even larger gap.
The inequality in the rates of return is particularly
strong at the top of the wage distribution, approxi-
mately from the 80th percentile onwards. These re-
sults are a clear indication of the existence of a
glass ceiling in female wage progression.
6. WAGE PROGRESSION AND DISPERSION IN
SOME OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES
A key issue in the analysis of wage progression
inside organizations is how they provide incen-
tives to workers over the employment spell. This
question plays a particularly important role in a
sector where productivity is difficult to measure,
such as public administration, and where wage in-
centives relating to progression over time are
among the most important available. This section
compares the progression pattern for a number of
occupational categories in general government.
This pattern should be understood as an observed
return and not as an expected return as a function
of seniority. Indeed, the current situation of work-
ers might have been influenced by progression
rules which may not be in place any more. The se-
niority coefficients discussed in the previous sec-
tions indicate that the returns to seniority increase
at a diminishing rate. However, this aggregate
analysis “hides” differentiated behaviour within
general government occupational categories.
The analysis includes eight occupational cate-
gories representative of careers typically spent at
low, intermediate and high wage cohorts. The oc-
cupational categories chosen also feature great ho-
mogeneity, measured by educational attainment of
employees inside each category, and when this
was not the case, we only considered workers with
the most frequent education degree in that cate-
gory. The average wage for each seniority year was
estimated. The results are presented as the relative
















Note: (1) and (2) are the coefficients estimated for the male
dummy variable, respectively, in equation (1) and in
the equation including the occupational category,
quantile regression method. (3) is the difference in
the distribution of the log hourly wage between
men and women, for the various quantiles.
Table 1
MACHADO-MATA DECOMPOSITION OF THE DIFFERENCE IN WAGES BY GENDER
Quantile 10. 20. 30. 40. 50. 60. 70. 80. 90.
Oaxaca
(OLS)
Difference in individual characteristics .......... -0.12 -0.18 -0.19 -0.24 -0.32 -0.31 -0.19 -0.13 -0.10 -0.17
Difference in the remuneration of individual
chararacteristics .............................. 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.07
Note: Difference in the individual characteristics obtained as   Qy Qy w
cf
w
f  	 and difference in the remuneration of the individual charac-
teristics as   Qy Qy w
m
w
cf  	 , where  Qw . is the w decile of the distribution of the log hourly wage estimated from equation (1) for
men and for women, that is  
   yX
mm m   and  
   yX
ff f   , and of the counterfactual distribution that would prevail if the male
endowment were remunerated at the price of the female endowment  
   yX
cf m f   . Calculated using a random sample of 25000
men and 25000 women, using the variant presented in Albrecht, et al. (2003).salary at each seniority level, compared to the sal-
ary prevailing at the end of the career (Chart 8). In
addition, a polynomial curve was fitted in order to
show the main tendency.
The progression pattern is quite different across
occupational categories, even for those which re-
quire similar educational attainment. For instance,
the progression for doctors and judges has a
marked logarithmic pattern, with high wage incre-
ments in the initial years which afterwards tend to
diminish quickly. On the contrary, primary and
secondary school teachers have significant wage
earnings at advanced stages in their career. This
type of progression seems more common in occu-
pational categories where employees do not have
post-secondary education. A common outcome for
all categories is the early attainment of a high
wage level in relative terms. This is explained by
quick initial progression and/or a relatively high
entry point. Among categories with higher entry
salaries, compared to salaries at the end of work-
ing life, are those where workers have less educa-
tion (administrative and auxiliary staff). Other
professionals are an exception, since they have
more room for progression than other categories
with the same educational requirements.
From this point of view, wage progression in
some occupational categories reveals a problem of
incentives at the final stages of professional life.
This is the case for judges (80% of final salary after
13 years of career), doctors (after 14 years) and
other professionals (after 15 years, but starting
Banco de Portugal / Economic Bulletin / Autumn 2005 9
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Chart 8 (to be continued)
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seniority (years)from higher initial salaries). For judges and doc-
tors, the wage increments at the end of working
life are negligible. For example, for judges there
are wage increments of 35 percentage points (p.p.)
in the first half of professional lives and of only 10
p.p. in the remaining 18 years of their careers.
These figures indicate a potential problem in terms
of keeping up incentives at advanced stages in the
career, which is even more serious as productivity
growth tends to decrease at this career stage. This
pattern does not encourage the extension of work-
ing life, and has negative consequences for the
minimization of productivity losses, in particular
in a sector featuring high employment protection.
In addition to the wage evolution pattern over
time, it is also interesting to examine evidence
about wage dispersion throughout a career in pub-
lic administration. Such dispersion is particularly
important as it might reveal to what extent manag-
ers are capable of rewarding the relative merit of
their co-workers. If progression over time in a
given category depended only on seniority (nil
dispersion), the average salary determined above
would coincide approximately with the observed
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Notes:
(a) Average salary by years of seniority for some occupational categories, as a percentage of the end salary.
(b) With post-secondary education.
(c) With lower secondary education.
(d) With less than lower secondary education.salary, for each level of seniority. That is, the corre-
lation coefficient would be close to 1. The bigger
this coefficient is, the higher the importance of
wage concentration generated by progression cri-
teria depending only on seniority. Table 2 presents
the results for the occupational categories studied
above.
Wage concentration is high for almost all occu-
pational categories. University teachers have the
lowest value. This may reflect the fact that pro-
gression in their case is conditioned by the acquisi-
tion of academic degrees, the conclusion of which
is subject to strong variability. The correlation co-
efficient for other professionals has also a rela-
tively smaller value, possibly due to a certain de-
gree of heterogeneity in this category and to the
fact that it is common to several ministries, and
this originates less uniform progression rules.
Judges and primary and secondary teachers show
on the contrary a very high wage concentration,
which stems from the homogeneity of functions
and concentration of workers in the same ministry,
giving rise to very uniform progression mecha-
nisms. This incapacity to introduce wage differen-
tiation translates into a disincentive for the
performance of workers, indicating a deficient
personnel policy.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this paper is to analyse the de-
termination of wages in public administration in
Portugal, using data form the 2nd General Gov-
ernment Census, which took place in December
1999. The econometric analysis of the information
available in the database was carried out mainly
through wage regression equations.
The results can be summarized as follows:
. The wage structure in general government is
strongly segmented in comparison to the
private sector, reflecting more rigid condi-
tions as far as entry and progression in the
various occupational categories are
concerned.
. There are high returns to education, in par-
ticular at the top of the hourly wage distri-
bution. The impact of schooling on wages is,
however, severely reduced when the occu-
pational category is added as control. This
result has no equivalent in the private sector
and may also be seen as an indicator of seg-
mentation around the occupational catego-
ries in public administration. In contrast,
controlling for the scope of govern-
ment/ministry does not imply a significant
change in the reward associated with the
characteristics of workers. This outcome re-
veals rigidity in the internal allocation of re-
sources, and lack of incentives to mobility
inside general government.
. Women benefit from wage returns to human
capital endowment which are below those
earned by men. This phenomenon is clearer
in the upper cohorts of the hourly wage dis-
tribution.
. There is a non-linear relationship between
salary and seniority: the associated reward
exhibits decreasing returns. This phenome-
non is partially explained by the tendency,
in those occupational categories where
workers are more qualified, for wage in-
creases to be concentrated at early stages in
the career. In general government a rela-
tively high wage level is attained in the ini-
tial years, in comparison to the expected sal-
ary at the end of the worker’s career (more
than half of wage progression is made in
one third of professional life). Education
plays a consistently important role as re-
gards wage determination even at later
stages in the employment spell, and this fact
is linked to permanency in a given occupa-
tional category. This suggests some failure to
reward the acquisition of specific human
capital by the employee.





Professionals (post-secondary educ.) ............. 0.59
Judges ....................................... 0.88
University teachers ............................ 0.51
Primary/secondary school teachers .............. 0.85
Auxiliary staff (less than lower secondary educ.) . . 0.81
Administrative staff (lower secondary educ.)...... 0.73
Craft workers ................................. 0.78
Doctors....................................... 0.63
Note: Correlation coefficient between the average wage and the
observed wage, by year of seniority.. Wage dispersion with seniority increase is
limited. Only in those occupational catego-
ries with a certain degree of functional het-
erogeneity, where workers are spread across
a number of ministries, or where further ad-
vancement in the career requires additional
qualifications, does there seem to exist some
dispersion. Otherwise, progression seems
rather uniform, pointing to an incentive
problem.
These results complement those drawn by
other papers on the Portuguese labour market, in
particular for the public sector. Some of the ques-
tions raised, concerning the reasons why wages in
the public sector are above those in the private sec-
tor, have been analysed in this paper from a gen-
eral government perspective. The characterization
indicates several efficiency problems concerning
the functioning of general government as an inter-
nal labour market. Besides rigidity in wage struc-
ture and lack of incentives for internal mobility,
also external mobility is discouraged by the quick
attainment of high remuneration levels. It should
also be taken into account that the civil servants’
social security system has been more favourable
than its private sector counterpart, which also con-
tributes to jeopardising external mobility. Added
to this is the much stronger employment protec-
tion in the public sector. The implementation of a
personnel management policy in an environment
with these type of characteristics has evident
limitations.
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APPENDIX 1
2nd General Public Administration Census - some descriptive statistics(a)
Table 1
HOURLY WAGES (PTE)
Men Women Non-graduate Graduate Total
Average..................................... 1476.2 1550.4 974.2 2353.4 1519.4
S d.......................................... 1126.4 969.6 498.5 1095.5 1038.6
Median ..................................... 999.3 1261.5 855.0 2155.8 1139.3
P 2 5......................................... 773.5 814.3 633.3 1627.8 793.5




Average ................... 15.3 15.0 15.1
S d........................ 9 . 9 10.0 10.0
Median .................... 15.0 14.0 15.0
P 2 5 ........................ 6 . 0 6 . 0 6 . 0
P 7 5 ........................ 23.0 24.0 24.0
Table 3
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS BY GENDER AND EDUCATION
(PERCENTAGE)
Men Women Total
Below lower secondary education ..... 38.2 22.8 29.1
Lower secondary education........... 14.2 11.9 12.8
Upper secondary education........... 15.1 17.4 16.5
Post-secondary education ............ 32.5 47.9 41.5
(a) Military personnel and regional government of Região Autónoma dos Açores not included14 Banco de Portugal / Economic Bulletin / Autumn 2005
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Table 4
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS BY THE LEGAL




Administrative fixed-term contract...................... 8 . 6
Fixed-term contract ................................... 4 . 2
Provisional appointment .............................. 2 . 4
Individual contract.................................... 1 . 9
Other ............................................... 2 . 7
Table 5
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS BY SCOPE OF
GOVERNMENT (PERCENTAGE)
Government scope
Sovereign bodies, ministerial staff and central government.......... 80.1
Local government.............................................. 17.1
Regional government........................................... 2 . 9
Table 6
DISTRIBUTION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT




Internal affairs ...................................... 9 . 7
Employment and social security....................... 5 . 2
Justice ............................................. 4 . 7
Finance ............................................ 3 . 4
Agriculture......................................... 2 . 8
Social infrastructure ................................. 1 . 3
Economy........................................... 1 . 1
Foreign affairs ...................................... 0 . 8
Environment ....................................... 0 . 7
Culture ............................................ 0 . 7
Planning ........................................... 0 . 6
Council to cabinet ................................... 0 . 4
Defence ............................................ 0 . 3
Science and technology .............................. 0 . 3
Reform of public administration ...................... 0 . 2
Table 7
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS BY
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY (PERCENTAGE)
Profissional category
Primary and secondary school teachers ................. 24.8
Auxiliary staff ....................................... 20.0
Administrative staff .................................. 11.3
Security forces ....................................... 7 . 9
Craft workers ........................................ 5 . 8
Nurses .............................................. 5 . 0
Technicians.......................................... 3 . 7
Other professionals................................... 3 . 5
Doctors ............................................. 3 . 5
Other technicians..................................... 2 . 3
University teachers ................................... 2 . 1
Managers ........................................... 1 . 5
Primary and kindergarten teachers ..................... 1 . 3
Administrative court staff ............................. 1 . 3
Polytechnical school teachers .......................... 1 . 0
Medical support staff ................................. 1 . 0
Other court staff...................................... 0 . 7
Prision guards ....................................... 0 . 6
IT staff .............................................. 0 . 5
Judges .............................................. 0 . 4
Firemen ............................................. 0 . 3
Research staff ........................................ 0 . 2
Other health professionals............................. 0 . 2
Criminal investigators ................................ 0 . 2
Diplomats ........................................... 0 . 1
Criminal investigation support staff .................... 0 . 1
Registrars and notaries................................ 0 . 1





ESTIMATION OF EQUATION (1) BY THE ORDINARY LEAST
SQUARES AND QUANTILE REGRESSION
5. 10. 25. 50. 75. 90. 95. OLS
Seniority .................................. 0.037 0.043 0.036 0.027 0.031 0.042 0.037 0.036
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Seniority2.................................. -0.039 -0.052 -0.033 -0.008 -0.013 -0.041 -0.026 -0.031
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
LSeducation ............................... 0.141 0.158 0.182 0.235 0.349 0.525 0.351 0.263
0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.001
USeducation ............................... 0.220 0.267 0.307 0.440 0.679 0.688 0.488 0.457
0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.001
PSeducation ............................... 0.895 1.015 1.087 1.138 1.178 1.277 1.118 1.112
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001
N P ....................................... -0.039 -0.105 -0.050 0.020 0.120 0.122 0.109 0.029
0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.0032 0.002
Gender M ................................. 0.020 0.027 0.043 0.048 0.091 0.145 0.137 0.068
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001
Constant .................................. 5.884 5.882 6.025 6.158 6.182 6.275 6.629 6.131
0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001
Notes:
• Regression carried out using 546,468 observations. Standard deviation in italics.
￿ Seniority in years; Seniority2 defined as (Seniority*Seniority)/100.
￿ Variables LSeducation, USeducation e PSeducation are equal to 1 when workers have, respectively, lower secondary, upper secondary
and post-secondary education.
￿ NP is equal to 1 for work relationships different from appointment.
￿ Gender M equal to 1 for male workers.
Table 2
ESTIMATION OF EQUATION (1) WITH DUMMY VARIABLES FOR THE SCOPE OF
GOVERNMENT/MINISTRY BY THE ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES AND QUANTILE REGRESSION
10. 50. 90. OLS
Seniority ............................................... 0.042 0.028 0.030 0.035
0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000
Seniority2............................................... -0.048 -0.014 -0.012 -0.029
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
LSeducation ............................................ 0.158 0.227 0.294 0.237
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001
USeducation............................................ 0.262 0.387 0.440 0.395
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001
PSeducation ............................................ 1.020 1.147 1.185 1.087
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001
N P .................................................... -0.117 0.013 0.283 0.034
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001
Gender M .............................................. 0.035 0.045 0.103 0.078
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
Notes:
￿ Regression carried out using 545,230 observations. Standard deviation in italics.
￿ See notes to Table 1 for the definition of variables.
￿ For confidentiality reasons, coefficients for the scope of government/ministry variables not shown.16 Banco de Portugal / Economic Bulletin / Autumn 2005
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Table 3
ESTIMATION OF EQUATION (1) WITH DUMMY VARIABLES FOR THE OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY BY
THE ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES AND QUANTILE REGRESSION
5. 10. 25. 50. 75. 90. 95. OLS
Seniority .................................... 0.032 0.030 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.024 0.022 0.026
0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026
Seniority2 ........................................ -0.037 -0.032 -0.021 -0.020 -0.004 -0.011 -0.012 -0.020
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.020
LSeducation................................. 0.043 0.042 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.058 0.100 0.055
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055
USeducation................................. 0.061 0.064 0.060 0.066 0.077 0.058 0.096 0.074
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.074
PSeducation................................. 0.142 0.130 0.085 0.087 0.124 0.149 0.212 0.147
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.147
N P......................................... -0.313 -0.325 -0.149 -0.074 -0.039 -0.028 -0.031 -0.124
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.124
Gender M................................... 0.003 0.011 0.014 0.022 0.049 0.081 0.106 0.024
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024
Notes:
￿ Regression carried out using 545,211 observations. Standard deviation in italics.
￿ See notes to Table 1 for the definition of variables
￿ For confidentiality reasons, coefficients for the occupational category variables not shown.